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Rule 1.6). The attorney-client privilege, which "applies in judicial and
other proceedings in which a lawyer
may be called as a witness or otherwise
required to produce evidence concerning aclientL]" was distinguished from
client-lawyer confidentiality, which
"applies in situations other than those
where evidence is sought from the
lawyer through compulsion of law."
Id at 5, 602 A.2d at 1222. The court
concluded that because Rule 1.6 applied in all situations, except where the
protected information was requested
under compulsion of law, the rule of
confidentiality was broader in scope.
Applying the attorney-client privilege to the instant case, the court found
that the information sought was beyond the scope of the privilege. The
client's explicit request that information be kept confidential did not create
a privilege under the law. While the
court acknowledged that the attorneyclient privilege is necessary to our legal system in order to assure that clients do not hesitate to seek legal advice
or to confide in their lawyers, the court
qualified this observation by noting
that "[t]he privilege is not absolute; it
does not restrict disclosure of every
aspect of what occurs between the attorney and the client." Id. at 11, 602
A.2d at 1225.
The court noted that a clear majority of jurisdictions have held that requiring disclosure of attorney's fees
did not violate the attorney-client privilege. Attorney's fees were an expected
part of the relationship and to some
extent the client was involved with the
attorney in an arms-length transaction
that was collateral to the privileged
relationship. Id. at 7, 602 A.2d at
1223.
The court described three general
exceptions to the rule requiring disclosure of attorney's fees. The "legal
advice" exception would apply where
the "disclosure of the information
would implicate the client in the very
matter for which legal advice was
sought in the first case." Id. at 7,602
A.2dat 1223 (quotingIn re GrandJury
26

Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 695 F.2d
363 (9th Cir. 1982». Another exception called the "last link" had been
applied where only the client's identity
was sought. The "communication exception" had been applied when "disclosure of the client's identity or the
existence of a fee arrangement would
reveal information that is tantamount
to a confidential professional communication." Id at 9, 602 A.2d at 1224.
The court, however, concluded that
these exceptions were "ill-defined and
overlapping" and in any case, distinguishable from the case. Id. at 7, 602
A.2d at 1223.
Judge Bell, in the lone dissent,
agreed with the majority's interpretation of Rule 1.6, as well as with the
conclusion that the instant case did not
fall under the recognized exceptions
where the attorney-client privilege
would be implicated. He dissented,
nonetheless, because he found the rationale presented for the majority's
holding that fee information was not
'confidential unpersuasive. Id. at 16,
602 A.2d at 1227. Payment of
attorney's fees, he contended, was at
the core rather than collateral to the
attorney-client relationship and should,
therefore, be privileged. Id. at 19,602
A.2d at 1229.
By allowing the subpoena of attorney fee records, the court has given
prosecutor another avenue for collecting evidence in the zealous hunt for
drug traffickers. Presumably evidence
offees paid to an attorney would not be
the only available evidence to establish the net worth of a suspect. More
importantly, knowing that his
attorney's fee records are likely to be
subpoenaed in any future action against
him, an individual accused of a crime
involving large sums of money will
think twice before he establishes this
record. Allowing ready access to fee
records may at some point conflict
with Maryland's clear public policy of
encouraging accused citizens to seek
legal assistance without fear oflack of
confidentiality.
- Dianne Moorehead Hughes

UnitedStatesDep'tofEnergyv. Ohio:
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY PROTECTED DEP'T FROM CIVIL
PENALTIES FOR PAST VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER
ACT AND RESOURCE CONSERVATION RECOVERY ACT.
In United States Dep 't ofEnergy v.
Ohio, 112 S. Ct 1627 (1992), the United
States Supreme Court held that the
Department of Energy ("DOE'') is exempt from state and federal civil penalties for past violations ofthe Clean
Water Act ("CWA") and the Resource
Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA'').
The Court held that because Congress
did not expressly waive the federal
government's sovereign immunity concerning past violations of the CWA
and the RCRA, the federal government
may only be liable for coercive fines
which prospectively modify behavior.
In 1986, the State of Ohio sued the
DOE for improperly disposing ofhazardous wastes from its uranium processing plant in violation ofthe CWA
and the RCRA. Relying on the federal
facilities and citizen suit sections ofthe
CWA and the RCRA, Ohio pursued
both state and federal civil penalties
for the DOE's past violations of these
laws. The federal facilities sections
govern the extent to which federal operations are subject to the CWA and
RCRA statutes. The citizen suit sections allow private individuals to enforce the CWA and RCRA. Ohio
brought suit in the United States District Court for Ohio, which held that
the CWA and the RCRA federal facilities and citizen suit sections waived
federal sovereign immunity for civil
penalties. Holding that Congress
waived immunity in all but the RCRA
federal facilities section, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affmned in part and reversed in
part. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether
Congress waived immunity for punitive fines in the CWA and the RCRA.
The Court began its analysis by
stating the common rule "that any
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waiver of the national government's
sovereign immunity must beunequivocal ...." Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1633. The
Court next analyzed the CWA and the
RCRA similar citizen suit sections.
The Court noted that the CWA citizen
suit section allows "any person" to be
held liable for past violations. [d.
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988)).
However, the Court determined that
''neither statute defines person to include the United States." [d. at 1634.
As a result, the Court found that the
civil penalties provision of the citizen
suit section, did not apply to the United
States. The Court explained its reasoning by pointing out that in other parts
of the statute, Congress explicitly defined ''person'' to include the United
States. Because Congress failed to do
so in the civil penalties section, the
Court held that Congress did not intend to waive sovereign immunity.
The Court next analyzed the CWA's
federal facilities section to determine if
civil penalties were allowed under that
section. Ohio argued that the civil penalties section waived the government's
sovereign immunity. Ohio further argued that the section used the word
"sanction" to mean civil penalty, which
can include a punitive fme. The Court
agreed with Ohio's assertion that the
principle of waiver applied to the government. Nevertheless, the Court explained that the word "sanction" does
not necessarily mean ''punitive fine,"
but also connotes coerciveness. Ohio,
112 S. Ct. at 1637.
Additionally, the Court held that
Congress intended "sanction" to have
a coercive implication. The Court
found that the word "sanction" was
used in the statute in conjunction with
''process and sanctions." [d. Because
"sanction" was used in relation with
the word ''process,'' which generally
refers to looking forward, the sanctions were found to be related to future
actions.
The Court refused to adopt Ohio's
argument that ''penalties prescribed by
state statutes" which had met Environmental Protection Agency approval

under the CWA were penalties "arising under federal laws." Ohio, 112 S.
Ct. at 1638.. Ohio buttressed its argument by noting that its state laws were
enacted pursuant to federal law and
thatthepwposeofOhio's laws were to
enforce the CWA. [d. The Court
rejected this argument, holding that
"arising under federal law" does not
include situations where state law is
relied upon, even if such state law is
ultimately bound by federal restrictions. [d. The Court recalled the requirement that any waiver of governmental immunity must be unequivocal, and noted that such a waiver was
not in the CWA. [d. at 1639.
Finally, the Court analyzed the federal facilities section of the RCRA.
The Court interpreted that section's
language excluding the government
from punitive measures, such as civil
penalties. [d. at 1639-40. The Court
did not find any language in the section
indicating that past violations should
be penalized, and concluded that Congress had no intention ofsubjecting the
United States to punitive fines forpast
violations of the RCRA. [d. at 1640.
Justice White, in a partial dissent
and partial concurrence, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, noted
that the majority did not follow traditional rules of statutory construction
and that the majority did not read the
"statute . . . as a whole." Ohio, 112
S. Ct. at 1141. The dissent concluded
that the CWA's federal facilities section provides that ''the United States
shall be liable" for civil penalties arising under state law. [d. (quoting 33
U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988)). The dissent
also believed that CWA's citizen suit
section provided "authority to sue any
person (including ... the United States
. . . .)" Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1142.
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988)).
The dissent further noted that the
CWA specifically provided for "an
extraordinary level of [federal] involvement" in state enforcement, blurring the distinction between federal
and state law. [d at 1643. As such, the
state law should be considered as "aris-

ing under" federal law, and the United
States sovereign immunity should be
considered waived. [d Finally, the
minority concurred with the majority
that the RCRA federal facilities provision did not provide for waiver of
sovereign immunity. [d. at 1144. Nevertheless, the minority did believe that
the RCRA citizen suit section provided for waiver of sovereign immunity. [d.
In United States Dep't ofEnergy v.
Ohio, the Supreme Court held that the
federal government cannot be penalized for past CWA and RCRA violations. By so ruling, the Court may
have encouraged government agencies
to ignore violations of the CWA and
the RCRA statutes. The agencies now
have less incentive to detect and cease
governmental violations, since such
agencies will not be liable for punitive
fines for past violations. The message
to the federal government is clear:
pollute until you get caught, and only
then take corrective measures.

- Bruce D. Hechmer
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